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Welfare and incarceration policies have converged to form a system of 
governance over socially marginalized groups, particularly racial minorities. In 
both of these policy areas, rehabilitative and social support objectives have 
been replaced with a more punitive and restrictive system. The authors 
examine the convergence in individual-level attitudes concerning welfare and 
criminal punishment, using national survey data. The authors’ analysis 
indicates a statistically significant relationship between punitive attitudes 
toward welfare and punishment. Furthermore, accounting for the 
respondents’ racial attitudes explains the bivariate relationship between 
welfare and punishment. Thus, racial attitudes seemingly link support for 
punitive approaches to opposition to welfare expenditures. The authors 
discuss the implications of this study for welfare and crime control policies by 
way of the conclusion. 
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Welfare benefits are intended to help the poor, and criminal 
punishment ostensibly sanctions law violators. On their face, these two 
policy arenas might seem distally related, but we posit they are 
interconnected in important ways. In the contemporary United States, 
an overall expansion of criminal punishment and rising incarceration 
rates have coincided with a contraction of welfare assistance and a 
reduction in the number of welfare recipients (Garland,1985, Soss & 
Schram, 2008; Wacquant, 2001, 2008). These trends replicate at the 
state level, in that states with more generous welfare policies tend to 
have less punitive incarceration policies, and vice versa (Beckett & 
Western, 1999). This finding leads Beckett and Western (1999) to 
argue that penal and welfare systems have converged into “a single 
policy regime aimed at the governance of social marginality” (p. 44). 
 
The expansion of criminal punishment and contraction of welfare 
disproportionately affect racial minorities who are overrepresented 
among those governed by the criminal justice and welfare systems. In 
addition, policy debates about welfare and punishment have been 
infused with racialized language and stigmatization (Edsall & Edsall, 
1991). Welfare reform debates, for example, have included explicit 
and implicit references to “welfare queens,” illegitimacy, a poor work 
ethic, and intergenerational welfare dependency (Hancock, 2004; 
Mink, 1998; Naples, 1997; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001). These 
references, along with the term welfare itself, are racially coded such 
that they are widely understood to refer to Black women (Neubeck & 
Cazenave, 2001). In political debates, crime and punishment are also 
frequently understood and discussed in racial terms. The “dangerous,” 
menacing and incorrigible qualities of criminals as racial codes for 
Black men has been well documented in policy debates regarding 
sports-based crime prevention programs like Midnight Basketball 
(Wheelock & Hartmann, 2007) and political campaigns (Mendelberg, 
2001).  
 
Although the convergence of criminal punishment and welfare 
policies is well documented, there have been few efforts to investigate 
whether individual attitudes concerning these policy regimes have also 
merged. We do not propose that policies can be reduced to their public 
support. Such a position would be an oversimplified account of the 
relationship between public support and policy formation. However, we 
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do feel there is reason to believe that policies and their respective 
public views share a mutually constitutive connection.1 To the extent 
that public opinion and public policy are related, then support for 
welfare retrenchment likely coincides with public views to enhance 
criminal punishment. 
 
Our exploration of the link between individual attitudes toward 
welfare expenditures and criminal punishment advances prior research 
that treats perceptions toward these policies as largely separate and 
unrelated. This research establishes that racial attitudes shape 
opinions regarding welfare (Dyck & Hussey, 2008; Gilens, 1999; 
Kinder & Sanders, 1996) and perceptions of criminal punishment 
(Chiricos et al., 1997; Quillian & Pager, 2001; Unnever & Cullen, 
2010). We examine whether racial attitudes, such as perceived 
intergroup conflict and belief in the stereotype that Blacks have a poor 
work ethic, shape individual understandings of welfare and criminal 
punishment. Specifically, we consider the following questions: Are 
welfare and punishment connected at the individual level such that 
opposition to welfare expenditures increases as support for harsh 
punitive sanctions increases? If so, to what extent do racial attitudes 
condition this relationship? Finally, are racial attitudes significant 
predictors of welfare and punitive attitudes? 
 
Our article is organized as follows. The following section further 
discusses the connections between welfare and criminal justice policy, 
including their role in regulating the behavior of marginalized 
populations and the surrounding racial dynamics of this arrangement. 
Next, we turn our attention to prior research on individual opinions 
toward welfare and punishment, paying close attention to how they 
are shaped by racial attitudes. Then, our data analysis proceeds in 
three steps. First, we test whether support for welfare expenditures 
and punitive attitudes are related at the bivariate level. Second, we 
examine whether this relationship holds after statistically controlling 
for relevant factors, including multiple indicators of racial attitudes. 
Employing multiple racial attitude measures allows us to conduct a 
nuanced and rigorous test of the role of racial attitudes. Third, we 
examine whether racial attitudes structure support for welfare 
expenditures and harsh criminal sanctions. In sum, our analysis 
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focuses on the link between punitive and welfare attitudes and on the 
role racial attitudes play in this relationship. 
 
Welfare and Punishment as Social Control 
 
Previous research has explored the role of state policy in 
monitoring and regulating the behavior of marginalized groups. 
Garland (1985) argued that penal practice and welfare policies aligned 
to form mutually reinforcing social institutions of control during the 
latter half of the 19th century in Victorian England. During this period, 
the penal system was “one element in a network of social institutions 
that addressed themselves to the disciplinary, moral and political 
regulation of these lower classes” (Garland, 1985, p. 40). He goes on 
to argue that many broad social, economic, and political factors led to 
the convergence of punishment and welfare as social control policies 
during Victorian England. This early convergence of penal and welfare 
systems embodied a “rehabilitative ideal,” which emphasized the 
state’s responsibility to help reintegrate marginalized groups (Garland, 
cited in Haney, 2004, p. 335). Welfare and criminal justice policies 
have again conjoined in the United States, but this recent union is 
characterized by “the decline of the rehabilitative ideal” and the rise of 
a more punitive orientation to welfare and punishment (Garland, 
2001). 
 
Welfare and penal policy have converged as forms of social 
control in the contemporary United States. Drawing on Epsing-
Andersen’s (1990) concept of “policy regimes,” Beckett and Western 
(1999) argued that welfare and penal policies cluster into a single 
policy regime that varies across states. Some states have inclusive 
policy regimes that “emphasize the need to improve and integrate the 
socially marginal and tend to place more emphasis on the social 
causes of marginality” (p. 44). Others adopt exclusionary regimes that 
“emphasize the undeserving and unreformable nature of deviants, 
tend to stigmatize and separate the socially marginal, and are hence 
more likely to feature less generous welfare benefits and more punitive 
anti-crime policies” (p. 44). By the mid-1990s, states with high 
incarceration rates tended to have less generous welfare systems, 
whereas states with low incarceration rates tended to have more 
generous welfare systems (Beckett & Western, 1999). 
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The increase in incarceration over the past 30 years is well 
documented. In 2009, prison and jails in the United States housed 
more than 2.2 million inmates, for an overall incarceration rate of 743 
per 100,000 in the population (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). 
Although the incarceration rate has increased among all racial groups 
during the modern era of penal policy, the increase among African 
Americans has been especially dramatic (see, e.g., Clear, 2007; Pettit 
& Western, 2004; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Western, 2006). Although 
these trends in criminal punishment began in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the passage of the 1994 Omnibus Crime Control Act marked 
the realignment of the political landscape concerning crime control 
policies. Being tough on crime was no longer a conservative position, 
as this legislation demonstrated that liberals also supported punitive 
crime control measures. During the period between 1994 (the passage 
of the Omnibus Crime Control Act) and 2001, the population under 
criminal justice supervision increased nearly 28% (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2007).2 Figure 1 displays the increase in prison rates between 
1980 and 2006. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that as incarceration rates have soared, 
welfare caseloads have declined. After a drastic increase during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, the percentage of the U.S. population 
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) remained 
steady during the 1970s and then declined somewhat during the 
1980s. After increasing during the early 1990s, the percentage of the 
population on AFDC or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
started to decline before implementation of the 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and 
continued declining after implementation. As Figure 1 shows, the 
percentage of the population on AFDC or TANF declined from 5.4% in 
1993 to 2.1% in 2000. 
 
In 1996, the PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF, placing greater 
restrictions on access to cash assistance. In doing so, it eliminated the 
entitlement put in place by the 1935 Social Security Act, meaning that 
cash assistance was no longer guaranteed based on financial need. 
The PRWORA established new time limits that limited welfare eligibility 
to 5 years or fewer, imposed work requirements as a condition of 
receiving assistance, and increased the ability of caseworkers to 
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sanction welfare recipients by reducing or terminating assistance. It 
also allowed states to implement family caps that deny benefit 
increases to women who have additional children while on welfare and 
to force mothers to identify the father of their children (Mink, 1998). 
In addition, certain provisions explicitly linked welfare benefits to crime 
control. The PRWORA imposed a lifetime ban from receiving TANF 
funds on individuals convicted of certain felony offenses and prohibited 
those accused of a parole or probation violation from receiving aid 
(Haney, 2004). 
 
The expansion of criminal punishment and retrenchment of 
welfare has had a disproportionately large impact on African 
Americans. Nationwide, young black men have a 28% likelihood of 
incarceration during their lifetime (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003); 
this estimate exceeds 50% among young Black high school dropouts 
compared to 11% for comparable White men (Western, 2006). 
Incarceration has become so commonplace among young African 
American males that it is likened it to a common life course event: 
“recent birth cohorts of black men are more likely to have prison 
records (22.4%) than military records (17.4%) or bachelor’s degrees 
(12.5%)” (Pettit & Western, 2004, p. 164). With regards to welfare, 
Black welfare recipients have outnumbered White recipients (Schram, 
2006). In 1999, for example, 30.5% of welfare recipients were White, 
38.3% were Black, and 24.5% were Hispanic (Schram, 2006, p. 207).3 
Other evidence suggests that Black and White women have different 
and unequal experiences in the welfare system. African Americans are 
projected to comprise more than two thirds of the family who will be 
forced out of the welfare system due to the 5-year federal time limits 
established by the PRWORA (Duncan, Harris, & Boisjoly, cited in Soss, 
Schram, & Fording 2006, p. 18). Also, under the PRWORA, African 
American welfare recipients are more likely than Whites to be 
sanctioned with reduced or terminated benefits (Schram, Soss, 
Fording, & Houser, 2009). 
 
As a whole, prior research rarely links welfare enrollment 
contractions with the expansion of criminal punishment while couching 
these changes in specific racial terms. Wacquant’s (2008) work on the 
emergence of the contemporary “ghetto” in the new era of the penal-
welfare state represents one of the few efforts to emphasize the 
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broader social forces contributing to the shifting roles of welfare and 
penal policies in managing marginalized groups. According to 
Wacquant (2008), the emergence of incarceration as a key institution 
in the lives of many African Americans reflects a reorganization of 
state policies, including welfare, and economic transformation: 
 
Since the debilitating crisis of the ghetto, symbolized by the 
great wave of urban revolts that swept the country during the 
mid-1960s, it is the prison that is in turn serving as a surrogate 
ghetto by warehousing the fractions of the African Americans 
(sub) proletariat that have been marginalized by the transition 
to the dual service economy and state policies of welfare 
retrenchment and urban withdrawal. (p. 3). 
 
As the amount of decent jobs and state assistance available to 
residents of poor urban communities has declined, poor African 
Americans have become more marginalized and more likely to be 
incarcerated. 
 
Attitudes Concerning Punishment, Welfare, and 
Race 
 
A wealth of social science research has examined different 
dimensions of public opposition toward welfare (Dyck & Hussey, 2008; 
Gilens, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kluegel & Smith, 1986) and 
support for harsh criminal sanctions (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 
2003; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997; Unnever & Cullen, 2010). Much of 
the work concerning welfare attitudes considers the extent to which 
economic ideology, principled opposition to government intervention, 
and racial attitudes explain opposition to welfare spending. This line of 
scholarship has been central to drawing out the underlying factors that 
shape public resistance to welfare programs. Equally central in 
literature concerning punitive attitudes has been research that 
examines the degree to which punitive attitudes result from a 
collective sense of group values or intergroup conflict and the tension 
between minority and majority group members. 
 
Negative attitudes about Blacks have emerged as a key 
explanatory variable capable of predicting opposition to welfare 
spending. Belief in the stereotype that Blacks have a poor work ethic is 
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a particularly strong predictor of Whites’ opposition to welfare (Dyck & 
Hussey, 2008; Gilens, 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997). 
The work ethic stereotype retains its importance even in the post-
PRWORA environment, where welfare has become less controversial, 
less visible, and less racialized in public discourse (Dyck & Hussey, 
2008). The perception that welfare primarily benefits Blacks also 
generates opposition to welfare among Whites (Gilens, 1999). 
 
Similarly, negative attitudes about Blacks have emerged as a 
key predictor of attitudes toward crime and criminal punishment. 
Studies show that attitudes toward African Americans can shape 
perceptions of neighborhood crime (Quillian & Pager, 2001), fear of 
crime (Chiricos et al., 1997), and punitive attitudes (Unever & Cullen, 
2010). In addition, support for harsh criminal punishment is connected 
to the typification of crime as a racialized social phenomenon (Chiricos, 
Welch, & Gertz, 2004). That is, White respondents who viewed 
criminals as being primarily Black were more likely to support harsh 
criminal sanctions net of demographic factors, crime salience 
variables, and attitude measures. In related work, D. Johnson (2008) 
found that racial prejudice expressed by Whites and perceived racial 
bias on the part of Blacks largely account for the racial gap in 
punitiveness. Additional studies have linked racial stereotyping (Peffley 
et al., 1997) with higher levels of punitiveness. We expect the 
relationship between support for welfare spending and punitive 
criminal policies to diminish to nonsignificance after we include the 
perception that African American disadvantage is explained by a lack 
of hard work and effort in the multivariate models. In addition, those 
who perceive hard work and effort as important in explaining African 
Americans’ economic disadvantage will likely oppose welfare spending 
and support punitive criminal justice policies. 
 
With the exception of Peffley et al. (1997), we are not aware of 
research examining attitudes about welfare and crime. Peffley et al. 
found that Whites who hold negative racial stereotypes tend to judge 
Black welfare recipients and Black drug suspects more harshly than 
they judge White welfare recipients and White drug suspects. More 
specifically, Whites who question the work ethic of African Americans 
are less likely to support providing welfare to Black recipients, and 
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Whites who perceive Blacks as “hostile” are more likely to approve of a 
police search involving Black suspects (Peffley et al., 1997). 
 
The relationship between individual attitudes and welfare and 
criminal justice policies is complicated to discern. In democratic 
societies, policies can generally be expected to be consistent with 
public opinion, and social scientists have noted that welfare and 
criminal justice policy decisions in the United States reflect public 
opinion. For example, in the later part of the 20th century, a White 
backlash against welfare and other programs perceived as benefiting 
urban Blacks contributed to reforms placing greater restrictions on 
access to welfare assistance (Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Quadagno, 1994). 
More recently, M. Johnson (2006) found that state-level welfare 
policies represent public preferences. Similarly, criminal justice policy 
is connected to public desires to punish (Savelsberg, 1994). Yet, 
because public opinion can be multifaceted, whether a particular policy 
outcome represents what the people want may be subject to 
interpretation. Also, in addition to public opinion, multiple factors 
shape policy outcomes, including the balance of political power, racial 
dynamics, policy feedbacks, and institutional characteristics of the 
state (Amenta, 1998; Huber & Stephens, 2001; Pierson 1994; 2001a; 
2001b; Quadagno, 1994; Skocpol, 1992). Even though a policy 
outcome may be consistent with public opinion it is rarely, if ever, 
caused by public opinion alone. 
 
The connections between welfare and punishment at the policy 
level motivate us to examine the extent to which these issues are 
connected in the attitudes of individual Americans. If public opinion 
and policies are similarly construed, then we expect to find that 
opposition to welfare coincides with support for punitive criminal 
sanctions. The first step in our analysis is to determine whether 
respondents who oppose welfare spending tend to support punitive 
criminal sanctions. 
 
We explore whether racial attitudes affect individual attitudes 
toward welfare and punishment, and if so, which specific dimensions of 
racial attitudes are the most salient. In addition, we also consider 
whether racial animus directed at African Americans mediates the 
relationship between opposition toward welfare and punitive attitudes. 
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Extant research identifies several different dimensions of racial 
attitudes that might affect public support for welfare and criminal 
punishment. This is an important point because many previous studies 
have employed only a single measure to capture respondents’ views 
toward African Americans. We posit that different dimensions of racial 
attitudes are not equally salient predictors of opposition to welfare and 
punitive attitudes. Thus, one key contribution of this study is to specify 
which measure of racial attitudes best accounts for any connection 
between opposition to welfare expenditures and support for criminal 
punishment. 
 
We first consider a measure of racial prejudice that is 
characterized by an explicit disapproval of a respondent’s son or 
daughter marrying a person of African American descent (Bobo & 
Kluegel, 1993; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000). Since the period 
of heightened civil rights activity in the 1960s, Whites’ racial attitudes 
have shifted such that open expressions of disdain for African 
Americans have steadily declined (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Schuman, 
Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sears et al., 2000). We suggest that 
individuals who still express racial prejudice are more likely to oppose 
welfare spending and support punitive criminal policies than those who 
do not. We examine whether disapproving of a child marrying 
someone of African American descent suppresses the association 
between support for welfare spending and punitive criminal justice 
policies. Furthermore, those who disapprove of a child marrying 
someone of African American descent will also tend to oppose welfare 
spending and support punitive criminal policies. 
 
A subtle form of racial prejudice has emerged that centers on 
the belief that African Americans’ failure to succeed results from 
deficiencies in moral character and work ethic, since the Civil Rights 
movement ostensibly removed the obstacles that had impeded their 
advancement (Kinder & Mendelberg, 2000; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; 
Kinder & Sears, 1981). These contemporary views of African 
Americans have multiple components, with the belief that they have a 
poor work ethic central among them (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Also 
included in these views is the belief that African Americans should 
work their way up without “special favors” such as affirmative action 
policies and that discrimination plays a minimal role in explaining racial 
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inequality. As previously discussed, the belief that Blacks have a poor 
work ethic is a key predictor of opposition to welfare (Dyck & Hussey, 
2008; Gilens, 1999; Peffley et al., 1997). We consider whether the 
relationship between support for welfare spending and punitive 
criminal policies diminishes after we include the perception that African 
American disadvantage is explained by a lack of hard work and effort 
in the multivariate models. We also consider whether those who 
perceive hard work and effort as important in explaining African 
Americans’ economic disadvantage tend to oppose welfare spending 
and support punitive criminal justice policies. 
 
The final measure of racial attitudes in our analysis draws from 
racial threat theory. Racial threat, one variant of the group threat 
thesis, focuses on intergroup conflict between racial groups. The group 
threat thesis posits that dominant group members perceive a 
prerogative over limited social resources such as good jobs, 
educational opportunities, and housing (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958). 
In this social arrangement, dominant group members view minority 
groups as a threat to these resources and thus utilize discrimination 
and social control as tools to manage minority groups. Research in this 
vein focuses on links between aggregate measures of racial threat, 
such as the percentage Black, and individual-level attitudes. For 
example, Baumer et al. (2003) found that individuals are more likely 
to support capital punishment, net of individual level characteristics, 
when they reside in areas with a higher concentration of Blacks. 
Taking from this research, we explore whether the perception that 
African Americans threaten public order contributes to opposing 
welfare spending and supporting punitive criminal sanctions. 
Therefore, we examine if the perception that Blacks pose a threat to 
public order and safety is a significant predictor of opposition toward 
welfare spending and support for harsh criminal sanctions. 
 
Overall, our central aim is to examine whether opposition to 
welfare spending and support for more punitive criminal punishment 
are linked, and the extent to which any connection is due to racial 
prejudice and perceived racial threat. We turn to discussing the data 
utilized in this study. 
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Data and Method 
 
Our data are from the 2003 American Mosaic Survey (AMS), a 
national telephone survey of adults residing in the United States using 
random digit dialing and Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
(CATI). The University of Wisconsin Survey Center administered the 
survey to 2,081 adults during Summer 2003. The survey was designed 
to gather data on attitudes about race, religion, politics, and views 
towards the welfare and criminal justice systems, as well as 
respondents’ background information. Although the AMS was collected 
in 2003, it contains measures on punitive attitudes, welfare attitudes, 
and attitudes toward African Americans along several different 
dimensions and is therefore well suited to examine the relationships 
between these indicators. We are aware of no other survey containing 
all these items, which makes the AMS well suited for this study. In 
addition, research indicates few, if any, significant shifts in racial 
attitudes (Hunt, 2007) or punitiveness (Barkan & Cohn, 2010) since 
2003. 
 
The survey administrators randomly selected households, and 
then respondents were randomly selected within households.4 The 
survey response rate (36%) compares favorably with the response 
rates achieved by most national random digit dialing-based studies 
(RDD). The extent to which our data are representative of the U.S. 
adult population, however, is even more important than the response 
rate. Prior work on response bias indicates few differences between 
higher response rates obtained by the General Social Survey (GSS) 
(50–60% ) and RDD surveys achieving rates between 27% and 36% 
with regards to demographic information and attitudinal indicators 
(Keeter, Miller, Kohut, Groves, & Presser, 2000). In line with this 
assessment of this study, the data at hand compare well with other 
national surveys such as the GSS and the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) on responses to a selection of a demographic, belief, and 
behavioral measures and has been employed in several recent studies 
concerning attitudes concerning religion (Edgel, Hartmann, & Gerteis, 
2006) and anti-Semitism (King & Wiener, 2007). 
 
The survey design entailed a split ballot, with one module of 
approximately one half of all respondents receiving a battery of certain 
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questions and a second module receiving other questions. Only a small 
randomized group of survey respondents replied to all of the key racial 
attitude indicators as they were split among both modules. Thus, 
including all three racial attitude measures restricts analysis to 245 
cases.5 However, only a small portion of the analysis relies on the 
results of 245 cases. Most of the analysis includes at least 800 cases. 
We feel this approach ensures the largest number of cases included in 
the analysis while also testing the stability of estimates across 
different sample sizes. 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Our dependent variable, punitive attitudes, comprises three 
indicators. Respondents were asked whether they strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with three 
statements concerning the treatment of criminals: the courts are too 
lenient with criminals, we need tougher prison sentences for repeat 
offenders, and a person convicted of murder should receive the death 
penalty. The response choices were recoded so that, for each 
measure, higher scores indicated stronger agreement with each 
statement (respondents refusing to answer and those answering “don’t 
know” were coded as missing). The three measures were combined 
into a single index with a standardized Cronbach’s alpha value of .69. 
Our punitive attitudes index ranges from 0 (low punitiveness) through 
9 (high punitiveness). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable 
are provided in Table 1. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Attitudes toward welfare expenditures comprise a single 
indicator. Survey respondents answered the question, “If you had a 
say in making up the federal budget this year, should spending on 
welfare-type programs be: increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same?” We coded increased as 1, kept the same as 2, and decreased 
as 3 so that higher values indicate opposition to welfare spending. We 
label this independent variable opposition to welfare spending. 
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We use several indicators to capture the different dimensions of 
racial attitudes. To test whether open disdain toward African 
Americans plays an important role in linking individuals’ views of 
welfare expenditures to criminal punishment, we use a survey item 
that asks respondents, “People can feel differently about their children 
marrying people from various backgrounds. Suppose your son or 
daughter wanted to marry an African American. Would you approve of 
this choice, disapprove of it or wouldn’t it make any difference at all 
one way or the other?” The response categories for the “disapprove of 
child marrying someone black” variable are coded as 1 (approve), 2 
(no difference), and 3 (disapprove). 
 
As previously stated, extant research shows that covert racial 
prejudice has largely supplanted openly hostile views against African 
Americans. To capture these subtle and yet potentially salient 
perceptions, we include a survey measure that asked respondents, “On 
the average, African-Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing 
than white people. Please say whether you think each of the following 
factors is very important, somewhat important, not very important, or 
not at all important in explaining that.” “Lack of effort and hard work” 
is one of the factors included in the survey questionnaire.6 We recoded 
responses so that those selecting 4 (very important), 3 (somewhat 
important), 2 (not very important), and 1 (not important at all). This 
variable is labeled “racial inequality due to lack of hard work.” 
 
We next measure perceived racial threat, which indicates 
respondents’ perceptions of African Americans as threats to public 
order and safety. We constructed the “Blacks threaten public order 
variable” from the question, “Do African Americans pose a greater 
threat to public order and safety than other groups, a lesser threat, or 
about the same as other groups?” Responses were coded 1 if they 
responded greater threat for African Americans and coded 0 if 
respondents selected lesser threat, equal threat, or they were not 
sure.  
 
We also statistically control for a number of demographic 
variables potentially correlated with punitive attitudes. Prior research 
suggests women are less punitive, at least with respect to 
consideration of the death penalty (Baumer et al., 2003). 
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Respondent’s sex is measured as a dummy variable where males are 
coded as 1. We include a measure for the respondent’s race with a 
race dummy variable, where 1 indicates whether a respondent is White 
and 0 for all other races. Related research suggests few differences in 
punitiveness for respondents with less than postgraduate education 
(King & Wheelock, 2007). However, because respondents with 
postgraduate degrees tend to be considerably less punitive, we include 
a dummy variable indicating a postgraduate degree (all others are in 
the reference category). Respondents’ employment status is a 
dichotomous indicator where the value 1 indicates the respondent is 
not working but currently looking for work, and the value 0 indicates 
that the respondent is working. Finally, we control for income, which is 
measured using eight categories, the lowest being “Less than $10,000 
per year” (coded 1) and the highest being “Over $100,000 per year” 
(coded 8). 
 
We also control for several political and religious variables 
associated with punitiveness. For instance, we control for Christian 
fundamentalism as measured by whether the respondent believes the 
bible is the “literal word of God” (coded 1; else coded 0). We 
statistically control for these views because prior research suggests 
fundamentalists are more punitive (Grasmick, Davenport, Chamblin, & 
Bursick, 1992; Grasmick & McGill, 1994). Given that political 
conservatives are generally more likely to support the death penalty 
and prior research finds an association between punitive practices and 
conservatism (Greenberg & West, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), 
we control for social and economic conservatism. We use the following 
measure to account for social conservatism: “In terms of social issues, 
do you consider yourself conservative, moderate, or liberal?” The 
measure of economic conservative substituted economic issues for 
social issues. Responses were coded as 1 if “conservative” was 
selected and 0 if “liberal” or “moderate” was selected. 
 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the 
analysis appear in Table 1. The descriptive statistics shown are for the 
full AMS sample and our most restrictive model with a subsample of 
245 respondents. 
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As Table 1 indicates, the respondents in our model closely 
resemble the full AMS sample on the racial attitudes measures. 
Compared to the full AMS sample, the respondents in our model are a 
bit less supportive of punitive criminal sanctions, more opposed to 
welfare spending, and more likely to be male. This is an important 
point because one potential concern with this study is the small 
sample size. However, we maintain confidence in our findings because 
most indicators included in the analysis have similar means and 
variances between the full sample of respondents and the subsample 
analyzed in this study. The subsample admittedly has a greater 
proportion of men than the full sample of respondents, but in all other 
respects the subsample mean scores and variances are either similar 
or identical to the full sample. 
 
Analytic Strategy and Statistical Models 
 
Our analytic strategy proceeds in three stages. The first stage 
examines whether opposition toward welfare expenditures and support 
for punitive criminal sanctions are correlated at the bivariate level. 
Second, we detect any changes to this relationship once other 
variables are introduced.7 The estimation method is ordinary least 
squares (OLS), because our dependent variable ranges from 0 to 9 
and approximates a normal distribution. Model 1 only includes the 
constant term and support for welfare expenditures to assess the 
magnitude of the bivariate relationship. Model 2 inserts the control 
variables to ascertain whether any relationship between support for 
welfare expenditures and punitiveness holds after accounting for 
demographic factors, political beliefs, income, unemployment, and 
education. 
 
Models 3 through 5 include all control variables and one racial 
attitude measure. These model specifications permit us to observe how 
each racial attitude measure influences the relationship between 
opposition to welfare expenditures and support for criminal 
punishment. Furthermore by examining the impact of each racial 
attitude indicator separately, we can maintain over 800 cases for 
Models 3 through 5. Model 6, the final multivariate OLS model, 
possesses all control variables and all three racial attitude measures. 
Although the subsample for Model 6 is relatively small, it is sufficient 
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for meeting the assumptions of linear regression analysis. 
Furthermore, finding a statistically significant effect is less likely with a 
small sample than it is with a large sample, which gives us additional 
confidence in our findings. The small sample would be problematic if 
we were interpreting “null findings” or the assumption that the 
covariates are not significant predictors for punitive attitudes. Because 
this is not our approach; the relatively small sample for Model 6 does 
not pose a serious concern for the results of this study.  
 
Finally, based on the results of the regression analysis, we 
construct a path model to show the relationship between racial 
attitudes, welfare, and harsh criminal sanctions. In this path model, 
we treat select indicators of racial prejudice as predicting opposition 
toward expanding welfare expenditures and support for criminal 
punishment. This model does not include a direct path between views 
toward welfare expenditures and support for criminal punishment. 
Because unique predictors of welfare and punishment are not available 
in our data, we are unable to model a recursive relationship. That 
being stated, the path model we specify can yield valuable insight on 
the degree to which individual level racial animus simultaneously 
predicts for views toward welfare and harsh criminal punishment. 
 
Results 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
Results of the multivariate analysis reveal a nuanced impact of 
racial prejudice and perceived racial threat on the relationship between 
opposition to welfare spending and support for harsh criminal 
punishment. As previously mentioned, Model 1 only contains the 
welfare spending variable and the constant term, Models 2 and 3 add 
additional predictors (see Table 2).  
 
Model 2 contains the views of welfare expenditure variable plus 
the control variables. Respondents with higher incomes are 
significantly less likely to support punitive criminal sanctions (–.089, p 
< 0.01) as are individuals who are unemployed (–.603, p < 0.01). 
Respondents with postgraduate education are less likely to report 
supporting harsh criminal punishment (–1.143, p < 0.001). White 
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respondents are more likely to hold harsh punitive attitudes relative to 
African Americans and Hispanic/Latinos (.373, p < 0.01) as are those 
who report being economically conservative. Respondents that report 
holding conservative views on economic issues are more supportive of 
punitive sanctions than are respondents who report having moderate 
or liberal views (.720, p < 0.001). Opposition to welfare spending 
remains a significant predictor of punitive attitudes (.634, p < 0.001) 
after controlling for individual demographics and political attitudes. 
 
Model 3 adds perceived racial threat, Model 4 includes inter-
racial marriage, and Model 5 contains work ethic. The results of these 
models show that all three racial attitude measures are statistically 
significant in each of the respective models. In Model 3, respondents 
that perceive African Americans as a threat to public order and safety 
are more likely to support harsh criminal punishment (.683, p < 
0.001). Models and 4 and 5 indicate similar trends for both 
respondents that do not approve of their child marrying a person of 
African American descent (.481, p < 0.001) and for those that 
reported believing that a lack of hard work explains the gap in 
achievement between African Americans and Whites (.483, p < 
0.001). These results support our contention that individual level racial 
animus is an important factor in shaping punitive attitudes. Also 
noteworthy is that the welfare expenditure measure is statistically 
significant in all three models indicating that in isolation, the racial 
attitude measures do not mitigate the relationship between opposition 
toward welfare and punitive attitudes. However, these models only 
provide a partial picture of how racial attitudes and perceived threat 
condition the relationship between views of welfare expenditures and 
penal sanctions. 
 
We insert all three racial attitudes indicators in Model 6. We find 
that White respondents (.727, p < 0.05) and social conservatives (.61, 
p < 0.05) are more likely to support harsh criminal sanctions 
statistically controlling for other factors in the model. In addition, 
respondents with a postgraduate education (–1.314, p < 0.01), higher 
incomes (–.19, p < 0.01), and those that report being unemployed (–
2.019, p < 0.01) all tend to be less punitive. Although many of these 
results replicate from Model 2, we also observe important shifts from 
previous models. First, the coefficient for the welfare spending variable 
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decreases in magnitude and becomes nonsignificant (.15). This finding 
confirms our key assumptions concerning the role of racial attitudes in 
conditioning the relationship between opposition toward welfare and 
support for harsh criminal punishment. Because it is inappropriate to 
directly compare changing coefficient magnitude across these models 
due to varying sample sizes, we also conducted additional analysis 
where we estimated the baseline model with the same 245 cases 
included in Model 6.8 In this supplementary analysis, the opposition to 
welfare spending coefficient decreased by 66.7% (.150–.450/.450) 
between the baseline and full models. Thus, including all three racial 
attitudes indicators decreases the effect of the welfare expenditure 
measure by two thirds and renders it nonsignificant. These results 
highlight the importance of racial attitudes in conditioning the 
relationship between opposition toward welfare and support for harsh 
criminal sanctions. 
 
Furthermore, we find that only two of the three racial attitudes 
indicators are statistically significant in the final OLS regression model. 
Respondents who would not approve of their child marrying a Black 
person are more likely to support punitive criminal sanctions than 
those who would approve (.514, p < 0.01), net of the other factors 
included in the model. Second, respondents who believe that African 
Americans on average do not do as well as Whites because of a lack of 
hard work and effort are also more likely to support punitive criminal 
sanctions than those who do not possess such beliefs (.612, p < 
0.001). When the perceived threat measure is the sole racial attitude 
indicator, in the multivariate models, it is statistically significant, but 
the inclusion of any of the other racial attitude predictors reduces the 
perceived threat predictor to nonsignificance. Although somewhat 
counterintuitive, this finding suggests that the racial dynamics that 
fuel the relationship between respondents’ views of welfare spending 
and punitiveness is not one of perceived threat as we thought might 
be the case. Rather, analysis of these data suggest that views of Black 
inferiority (as expressed by resistance towards inter-racial marriages 
and the belief that Blacks are lazy and do not work hard) are the key 
concepts that link views in these two policy arenas. In this way, the 
results of Model 6 also illuminate the importance of investigating the 
role of multiple racial attitudes indicators when modeling for punitive 
attitudes. 
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As a final note on the multivariate regression models, we also 
observed a change between Model 2 and Model 6. Namely, the social 
conservative variable is nonsignificant in Models 2 through 5 but is 
now statistically significant in Model 6. There are several factors 
contributing to it. First, social conservatism is correlated with religious 
fundamentalism (r = .314, p < 0.001) and economic conservatism (r 
=.194, p < 0.001). We estimated Model 2 without these two variables 
and social conservatism becomes significant (.577, p < 0.001). 
Second, additional analysis9 of the 47 non-White respondents showed 
that there is a correlation between the social conservative variable and 
punitiveness even though this relationship does not hold for White 
respondents. Last, the effect of the socially conservative indicator is 
suppressed until all three racial attitude measures are included in the 
model. If we exclude racial attitudes measures from the last model, 
the coefficient for social conservatism becomes nonsignificant (.596, p 
= .057). 
 
In sum, accounting for all three racial attitude indicators in the 
model unmasks unique contributions of the White dummy variable and 
social conservative indicator in the models. Although the OLS models 
shed light on the role racial prejudice plays in conditioning the 
relationship between opposition toward welfare expenditures and 
individual-level punitiveness, they do not fully capture the nature of 
this intersection in the way we envision it. To better test for a more 
complicated relationship between these factors, we employ a path 
model. 
 
Path Model Analysis 
 
We constructed a path model that represents our vision of how 
racial prejudice, support for welfare expenditures, and punitive 
attitudes are interconnected (see Figure 2). The results of the 
multivariate analysis guided construction of a parsimonious path model 
that only includes the statistically significant racial attitude indicators 
from Model 3. We specify the path model so that racial attitudes 
predict attitudes toward welfare and punishment. As previously stated, 
data limitations prohibit us from testing for a recursive path between 
opposition to welfare spending and punitive attitudes. The model has 
paths from the covert and overt racial prejudice indicators (the 
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intermarriage and hard work variables, respectively) to the welfare 
and punitive attitude measures. The purpose of the path model is to 
test whether these specific dimensions of racial attitudes 
simultaneously predict opposition to welfare spending and support for 
punitive criminal sanctions. 
 
The path model yields results that replicate the results of the 
OLS models and are consistent with our assumptions concerning the 
link between covert and overt racial prejudice and punitive attitudes. 
In addition, it suggests that racial prejudice is a salient predictor of 
opposition towards welfare expenditures. Disapproval of interracial 
marriage is a statistically significant predictor of opposition to welfare 
spending (.154, p < 0.05) and of support for punitive criminal 
sanctions (.210, p < 0.01). Our measure of covert racial prejudice, 
racial inequality due to lack of hard work, is a significant predictor 
of punitive attitudes (.346, p < 0.01). In contrast, the hard work and 
effort indicator is only a marginally significant predictor of attitudes 
towards welfare spending (.122, p = .099). 
 
Overall, the results of the path model support the conclusion 
that respondents’ understandings of welfare and criminal punishment 
are shaped by their antipathy toward African Americans. The findings 
indicate that respondents who would disapprove of their child marrying 
someone of African American descent are more likely to oppose 
welfare spending and more likely to support harsh criminal punishment 
than those who approve of interracial marriage. At the same time, 
respondents who view racial inequality as resulting from a lack of hard 
work on the part of Blacks score significantly higher on the punitive 
attitude scale than those who do not view racial inequality as resulting 
from a lack of hard work. 
 
We were surprised that the hard work and effort measure is not 
a more robust predictor of opposition to welfare spending given that 
previous research indicates that Whites who believe Blacks have a 
poor work ethic are more likely to oppose welfare (Gilens, 1999; 
Kinder & Sanders, 1996). We would not interpret our results as 
challenging previous scholarship because the absence of a significant 
relationship between these variables could be the result of our small 
sample size. Furthermore, the coefficient for our hard work and effort 
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measure was significant at the 0.1 p value in the expected direction. 
In addition, we feel this bolsters our findings because the results affirm 
many of our key hypotheses despite the small sample. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results of the analysis generally support our hypotheses. 
The bivariate analysis indicates a connection between individual 
attitudes toward welfare and punishment, in that those who oppose 
welfare spending are also more likely to support punitive criminal 
sanctions. This resembles the inverse relationship observed between 
welfare and punishment at the level of policy and supports our first 
hypothesis. Racial attitudes, however, mitigate the relationship 
between support for criminal punishment and opposition to welfare 
expenditures. 
 
The results of the OLS regression analyses (see Table 2) support 
many of our expectations. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 
regression models show a significant relationship between opposition 
to welfare spending and support for punitive criminal sanctions that 
even holds after we introduce demographic and other control 
variables. This relationship changes little when statistically controlling 
for one racial attitude measure but accounting for all three 
simultaneously decreases the relationship between welfare spending 
attitudes and punitive attitudes to non-significance. Respondents who 
disapprove of interracial marriage and believe that a lack of hard work 
and effort explains why Blacks are, on average, economically worse off 
than Whites express more support for punitive criminal sanctions. Our 
results do not support the notion that respondents that perceive Blacks 
as a threat to public order and safety would express more support for 
punitive criminal sanctions than respondents that did not perceive 
them as a threat. 
 
This curious finding is not necessarily inconsistent with existing 
literature in that perceived threat to public safety is not as salient in 
shaping punitive attitudes compared to perceived economic threat 
(King & Wheelock, 2007). It is also plausible that perceived threat is 
not a salient predictor of punitive attitudes relative to other racial 
attitude measures. As previously discussed, when perceived threat is 
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the only racial attitude measure in the model, it is a statistically 
significant predictor of punitive attitudes and it is not until the other 
racial attitudes are included that it becomes non-significant. 
 
The path model (see Figure 3) further explores the relationship 
between racial attitudes, support for welfare, and punitive attitudes. 
As we had proposed, disapproval of interracial marriage predicts 
opposition to welfare spending and support for punitive criminal 
sanctions. The data also indicate that respondents who feel that 
African Americans are economically worse off than Whites because of 
their own lack of hard work are significantly more likely to support 
harsh criminal punishment and marginally more likely to oppose 
welfare expenditures. As discussed above, these findings provide 
limited support for our third hypothesis. We are not aware of other 
research that examines the relationship between concern about the 
work ethic of Blacks and attitudes towards criminal punishment.10 
Thus, concern about the work ethic of Blacks may have a broader 
impact on the individual outlooks of Americans than previously 
thought. However, because this study is unable to include a recursive 
relationship between opposition toward welfare and punitive attitudes, 
future research should examine whether a recursive relationship 
emerges between opposition toward welfare and punitive attitudes. 
Future research efforts might also want to explore whether state 
context contributes to the way in which racial attitudes, opposition 
toward welfare expenditures, and support for harsh criminal 
punishment are inter-related. 
 
Based on the results at hand, we theorize that individual-level 
opposition to welfare spending and support for strong criminal 
sanctions reflects a desire to establish social control over marginalized 
groups. This proposition extends Beckett and Western’s (1999) 
suggestion that penal and welfare systems have converged into “a 
single policy regime aimed at the governance of social marginality” (p. 
44) to the level of individual attitudes. Furthermore, we suggest that 
the perceived need for such social control or “governance” is driven by 
the fact that individuals located in penal and welfare systems are 
disproportionately minorities and the related perception that they have 
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engaged in undesirable behavior. Such behaviors include engaging in 
crime, being dependent on welfare, and, for welfare recipients, and 
having children outside of marriage. 
 
Policies and public opinion reflect the stigmatization of welfare 
receipt and criminality. Welfare recipients are generally categorized as 
members of the undeserving poor, rather than as poor people who 
deserve public assistance and sympathy (Katz, 1998; Steensland, 
2006). Convicted criminals are stigmatized to an even greater extent, 
as evidenced by the increasing severity of criminal punishment and by 
the growing class of felons who have been stripped of basic rights of 
citizenship, including the right to vote. Receiving welfare assistance 
and criminality place individuals on the wrong side of moral divides 
and subject them to intensive scrutiny and regulation. Although 
benevolent intentions, such as the desire to promote economic 
self-sufficiency and to protect people from crime, certainly play a role 
in this scrutiny and regulation, the racial logic embedded in these 
programs and policy arenas conditions their link with each other. 
Similarly, racial attitudes connect welfare and punishment at the 
individual level and explain preferences for punitive approaches. 
 
Public perceptions of African Americans as undeserving welfare 
recipients and incorrigible criminal threats have not gone unnoticed in 
the political arena. Politicians have strategically utilized White fears 
and stereotypes to win elections (Mendelberg, 2001) and to shift 
legislative outcomes (Wheelock & Hartmann, 2007). Many of these 
perceptions fit neatly into conservative arguments in support of 
expanding criminal justice and contracting public assistance. By the 
mid-1990s, however, political liberals and conservatives alike called for 
expanding crime control and reforming welfare. Unable to challenge 
the prevailing racial logic of welfare recipients and criminals, some 
liberals have operated within this paradigm even while arguing for less 
punitive welfare reforms and penal policies than conservatives. Thus, 
racialized understandings of welfare and criminal punishment have 
influenced the politics and public perceptions of crime, punishment and 
welfare. 
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Notes 
 
1. Social scientists have debated the role of public attitudes in policy 
formation. Some argue that elites set the stage for policy formation and 
then work to garner support for specific pieces of legislation (Beckett, 
1994), others posit that the link between policy and public opinion is a 
populist one whereby political leaders are beholden to their constituency 
and thus seek to advance legislation that already has considerable public 
support (Savelsberg, 1994). We do not attempt to advance either of these 
positions and only rely on the notion that public opinion and public policy 
are connected in deep and important ways. 
2. The 2001 estimate excludes probationers in prison or jail. 
3. Remaining welfare recipients are racially classified as Asian, Native 
American, Other, or Unknown (Schram, 2006, p. 207). 
4. The survey’s purpose was to collect data on respondents’ attitudes about 
the role of race in American society; therefore, African Americans and 
Hispanics were oversampled to ensure adequate representation of these 
populations for making comparisons across racial groups. This 
oversampling was accomplished by calling more heavily in areas that have 
high concentrations of African Americans and Hispanics (the survey was 
conducted in Spanish when requested). 
5. Although this is not ideal, we conducted additional analyses with different 
combinations of the racial attitude indicators to include additional cases 
and the results generally replicate. In addition, we show how our sample 
compares with the full AMP sample in the following description of the 
variables used in our analyses. We discuss the implications for a small 
sample and why we maintain confidence in the results later in the 
following section. 
6. Other explanations for racial inequality consisted of racial discrimination 
and social institutions. These were excluded from this study because our 
attention is focused on covert racial prejudice. 
7. We specify support for punitive criminal sanctions as the dependent 
variable but this model specification was somewhat arbitrary. Support for 
welfare expenditures could have been the dependent variable since our 
primary argument rests on the prediction that the relationship between 
the two is spurious after we include racial attitude measures. However, 
the tradition of punishment and welfare research tends to specify 
punishment as the dependent variable both theoretically (Garland, 1985, 
2001) and empirically (Beckett & Western, 1999). 
8. The results of these additional analyses are available from the authors 
upon request. 
9. Available from the authors upon request. 
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10. As previously mentioned, extant research links concern about the work 
ethic of African Americans to opposition to welfare and other racial social 
policies (Gilens, 1999; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). 
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FIGURE 1 Percentage of the population that has received aid to families with 
dependent children/temporary assistance to needy families benefits and prison rates in 
the United States, 1980–2006. 
 
Sources. U.S. Department of Justice (2003, 2007), Carter et al. (2006), U.S. Census 
Bureau (2008), U.S. House of Representatives (2004). 
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FIGURE 2 Path analysis: Effects of overt and covert racial attitudes on opposition to 
welfare spending and punitive attitudes. 
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. 
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